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TIIE EPISTEMOLOGICAL GOAL OF 
INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGY: 
TIIE PERSPECTIVE OF CONS1RUCTIVE REALISM 
Kwang-Kuo Hwang 
National Taiwan University 
Taipei, Taiwan 
Since the emergence of indigenous psychology in the 1970s, many 
debates about its epistemological goal have taken place between its propo-
nents and mainstream psychologists. In order to settle these debates, it is 
necessary to agree on a sound philosophical foundation for the future devel-
opment of indigenous psychology. The philosophy of constructive realism 
advocated by the Vienna School in recent years may provide such a philo-
sophical foundation. In this article, I first review the epistemological chal-
lenges faced by indigenous psychologists. I argue that tl1ese challenges and 
ilieir solution should be understood in tl1e context of tl1e modernization of 
non-Western countries. Then I illustrate the main ideas of constructive real-
ism. Finally, I explain how the philosophy of constructive realism can be 
used to meet the epistemological challenges encountered by indigenous 
psychologists. 
The Emergence oflndigenous Psychology 
Since the encl of the 1970s, a number of psychologists have begun to 
advocate an indigenous approach to psychology in non-Western countries 
such as Mexico (Diaz-Guerrero, 1977), Korea (Kwon, 1979),Japan (Azuma 
& Imada, 1994), the Philippines (Church, 1984; Enriquez, 1977; Lagmay, 
1984), India (Sinha, 1986), and Taiwan (Yang, 1997). In the early 1990s, 
the Communist countries of Eastern Europe collapsed, the long-lasting 
Cold War between the East and West after World War II came to an encl, 
and various forms of ethnic conflict broke out all over the world. The clash 
of civilizations became a major issue in the new age of globalization 
(Huntington, 1996). Parallel to these developments, an indigenous psy-
chology movement has spread to many areas of the world and attracted 
increasing attention from mainstream psychologists (Shiraev & Levy, 2001). 
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Generally speaking, the emergence of indigenous psychology in non-
Western countries has been inspired by a spirit of nationalism and anti-
colonialism. Most psychologists in non-Western countries adopt concep-
tual frameworks and research methods developed by Western psycholo-
gists when conducting research in their native societies (Kao & Sinha, 
1997; Mehryar, 1984; Sinha, 1986). Their research findings may be irrel-
evant to the psychology of the local people, and thus are unable to solve 
problems faced in people's daily lives. The problem of implantation may 
be most serious in the case of social psychology. Most knowledge in this 
field has been developed in the United States. American psychologists 
usually focus on issues relevant to their home society both as research 
topics and as the framework for theoretical construction (Moscovici, 1972). 
Four levels of ethnocentric bias are therefore likely in Western psychologi-
cal research Werry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002): 
1. Selection of items and stimuli in an instrument. 
2 Choice of instruments and procedures. 
3. Definition of theoretical concepts. 
4. Choice of topic for research. 
As a consequence, findings derived from replicating Western research 
paradigms might be ill'elevant to or inadequate for understanding the 
mentality of people in non-Western countries (Sinha, 1986, 1988). The 
imposition of a Western research paradigm on non-Western countries can 
be viewed as a kind of cultural imperialism or colonialism (Ho, 1998). By 
ignoring the fact that many Western theories of social psychology are 
culturally bound, duplication of a Western paradigm in non-Western coun-
tries may result in neglect of cultural factors that may influence the devel-
opment and manifestation of human behavior. 
Based on such reasoning, many indigenous psychologists advocate "a 
bottom-up model building paradigm" (Kim, 2000, p. 265); promote "the 
study of human behavior and mental processes within a cultural context 
that relies on values, concepts, belief systems, methodologies, and other 
resources" (Ho, 1998, p. 94); and treat people "as interactive and proactive 
agents of their own actions" that occur in a meaningful context (Kim, Park 
& Park, 2000, p. 71). They perform "the scientific study of human behavior 
(or the mind) that is native, that is not transported from other regions, and 
that is designed for its peoples" (Kim & Beny, 1993, p. 2) in order to 
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develop a "cultural-appropriate psychology" (Azuma, 1984, p.53); "a psy-
chology based on and responsive to indigenous culture and indigenous 
realities" (Enriquez, 1993, p.158); or a psychology whose "concepts, prob-
lems, hypothesis, methods, and test emanate from, adequately represent, 
and reflect upon the cultural context in which the behavior is observed" 
(Adair, Puhan & Vohra, 1993, p.149). 
Challenges to Indigenous Psychology 
The approach of indigenous psychology just described has been criti-
cized by mainstream psychologists. For example, Triandis (2000) pointed 
out that anthropologists have used a similar approach for years, and that 
accumulating anthropological data with an idiosyncratic approach may 
not have much significance in terms of contribution to the development of 
scientific psychology. 
Poortinga (1999) indicated that an internal contradiction for develop-
ment of indigenous psychology is implied in the usage of plural "indige-
nous psychologies" by many indigenous psychologists. The development 
of multiple psychologies not only contradicts the scientific requirement of 
parsimony, but also makes the demarcation of cultural populations an 
unresolved problem. If every culture has to develop its own psychology, how 
many indigenous psychologies should there be? How many psychologies 
would have to be developed for Africa' What is the optimal number of 
indigenous psychologies? What is the meaning of an indigenous psychol-
ogy developed in a specific culture to people in other cultures? 
David Ho is a supporter of indigenous psychology and has advocated 
for the development of an Asian psychology (1988) with warnings that 
blindly transporting the research paradigms of Western psychology into 
non-Western countries may lead to the trap of Western ethnocentrism. 
However, he has also pointed out that if eve,y culture develops its own 
psychology, another kind of ethnocentrism in reverse would arise. Poortinga 
0996) made similar criticism on this point. He argued that over-emphasis 
on the nature and extent of differences in psychological functioning be-
tween people of different cultures may make indigenous psychology a 
kind of "scientific ethnocentrism in a new guise." 
Hermans and Kempen 0998) proposed the concept of "moving cul-
ture," which is changing continually over time, and discussed the perilous 
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problems of cultural dichotomies in a globalizing society When inter-
cultural communications become so frequent that the whole world is a 
global village, can culture be regarded as internally homogenous and 
externally distinctive? If individuals are able to choose and decide their 
own behavior, culture may have no necessary influence on the individual; 
psychological traits and mechanisms would be incidental. The notion of 
regarding culture as a psychological system becomes less feasible. Instead 
of regarding culture as a stable system geographically located in a particu-
lar area, it would be more viable to define cross-cultural differences in 
terms of specific ecocultural and sociocultural conditions (Poortinga, 1999). 
Poortinga 0999, p. 425) strongly suggested that "differences in beha-
vioral repertoires across cultural populations should be understood against 
the background of a broader frame of commonness." He argued that over-
emphasis on cross-cultural differences in behaviors and negation of impor-
tant invariance in psychological functioning across different cultures is not 
only "factually incorrect," but also "theoretically misleading" (Poortinga, 
1999, p. 419). 
Philosophical Foundation of Indigenous Psychology 
In order to meet the challenge of multiple indigenous psychologies, 
many indigenous psychologists have argued that the final goal of indig-
enous psychology is to develop an Asian psychology (Ho, 1998), a global 
psychology (Enriquez, 1993; K. S. Yang, 1993, 2000), a human psychology 
(K. S. Yang, 1993), or a universal psychology (Berry & Kim, 1993). A careful 
examination of the controversial debates between indigenous psycholo-
gists and mainstream psychologists reveals that both camps concentrate 
their arguments on the issue of the epistemological goal for the develop-
ment of indigenous psychology. A persuasive discourse to settle all related 
debates could not be provided if arguments are restricted only to the 
epistemological level. 
In my article "Constructive Realism and Confucian Relationalism: An 
Epistemological Strategy for Developing Indigenous Psychology" I argued 
that there are three levels of breakthroughs to be made for the development 
of an indigenous psychology, namely, philosophical reflection, theoretical 
construction, and empirical research. On the level of philosophical reflec-
tion, indigenous psychologists should propose a philosophy that is able to 
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explain the essential difference between knowledge constructed by scien-
tists after the 14"' Century European Renaissance and that which was de-
veloped by people of non-European cultures during the course of their 
long histories. The goal of this philosophical reflection should be able to 
answer the following questions: 
1. What is the meaning of modernization? 
2. What is the meaning of modernization to non-Western societies' 
3. Why has the movement of indigenous psychology emerged in many 
non-Western countries when the scientific communities of the world 
are dominated by Western psychology? 
4. What kind of knowledge ought non-Western psychologists to pursue 
as scientists? 
In other words, the emergence of the indigenous psychology move-
ment can be concep~alized as a reaction by non-Western scholars against 
the blind imposition of Western paradigms on research conducted in indi-
genous societies. It is inspired by a spirit of nationalism or anti-colonial-
ism. In order to settle debates about the epistemological goals of indig-
enous psychology, it is necessary to explain its occurrence in a broader 
context that illuminates the modernization of non-Western societies. 
It seems to me that Western modernization has been characterized 
and supported by a special kind of knowledge constructed on the basis of 
philosophy of science. Two years ago, I published a book titled The Logic 
of Social Science that systematically presented major contributions of 17 
major Western philosophers of the 20"' century to the progress of philoso-
phy of science with respect to their viewpoints on ontology, epistemology, 
and methodology (Hwang, 2001). The book contains five parts: (a) positiv-
ism, (b) post-positivism, (c) structuralism, (d) hern1eneutics, and (e) critical 
theory. The last chapter concludes with the philosophy of constructive 
realism. The theme of the first two parts of the book, positivism and post-
positivism, is the philosophy of science mairily applied to natural science. 
Because psychology has traditionally been defined as a branch of science 
by Western psychologists, tl1is philosophy of science is also used by many 
psychologists. The last three parts of the book, dealing with structuralism, 
hermeneutics and critical theory, contain paradigms frequently used by 
social scientists. Constructive realism is discussed in the last chapter as a 
philosophy of science and is proposed with an attempt to integrate its 
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previous development by Dr. Fritz Wallner, who organized the Vienna 
School, (not to be confused with the Vienna Circle, which was active in the 
world scientific community in 1930s) (Wallner, 1994; Slunecko, 1997). 
Constructive realism classifies reality into three categories: reality it-
self (wirklichkeit), lifeworld, and microworld. Reality itself is something 
that cannot be understood by human beings. Human beings can under-
stand only the worlds they have constructed with language, which include 
the /ifeworlds constructed by cultural groups in their long development, 
and the scientific microworlds constructed by individual scientists. 
Two Types of Knowledge in the Scientific Microworld 
and the Lifeworld 
The separation of the knowable world into lifeworld and scientific 
microworld is very helpful for coping with the challenges encountered by 
indigenous psychologists, although Wallner's description of these two worlds 
is not clear enough to answer the aforementioned questions with regard to 
indigenous psychology. For this reason, I have reviewed previous dis-
courses on the difference between the types of knowledge constructed in 
the lifeworld and the microworld (Hwang, 2000), and compared them on 
five concerns, namely, the constructor, ways of thinking, types of rational-
ity, patterns of construction, and functions of worldview (see Table 1). 
Table 1 
Two Types of Knowledge in Lifeworld and Scientific Microworld 
Lifeworld Scientific Microworld 
Constructor Cultural group Single scientist 
Ways of thinking Originative thinking Technique thinking 
Types of rationality Substantive rationality Formal rationality 
Patterns of construction Participative constructive Dominative construction 
Functions of worldview Meaning of life Recognition of world 
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The microworld of scientific knowledge is constructed by a single 
scientist, while the language and knowledge used by people in their 
lifeworlds is constructed by a group of people living with the same cultural 
background for a long period oftime. In the originating years of a particu-
lar culture, people concenlnte themselves on observing the external world 
and contemplating the nature of every object in the lifeworld. They try 
their best to make every thing manifest itself in the language they create to 
represent it. Heidegger labeled this way of thinking originative thinking or 
essential thinking (1966). In contrast, the language used by scientists to 
construct microworlds of scientific knowledge is intentionally created to 
reach a specific goal. 111e language has a compulsory and aggressive cha-
racter that demands the most gain with the least cost, and is a product of 
technical thinking or metaphysical thinking from Heidegger's perspective. 
From the perspectives of insiders living in a given society, collective 
consciousness and social representations are all rational (Durkhein1, 1912/ 
1965). But there is a fundamental difference between the rationality used 
for constructing a scientific microworld and that used in a lifeworld. In 
their lifeworlds, people emphasize the importance of substantive rational-
ity, which refers to the value of ends or results judged from a particular 
position. It is completely different from the formal rationality for con-
structing scientific rnicroworlds used by Western scientists after the Euro-
pean Renaissance. Formal rationality emphasizes the importance of goals 
or results and provides no clear-cut means and procedures for reaching 
them. Only a few persons who are familiar with the special means and 
procedures can use them to pursue worthy goals. Substantive rationality 
pays attention only to value-neutral facts and the calculability of means 
and procedures that can be used by everyone to pursue their personal 
goals (Brubaker, 1984). 
Scientists construct their microworlds using Cartesian dualism through 
dominative construction (Shen, 1994). They construct these scientific 
microworlds about various aspects of their external world that concern 
human beings in order to attain the goal of controlling and utilizing nature. 
These scientific microworlds are neither pern1anent nor absolutely certain; 
each has its own specific goal. When the goal loses importance, or when 
people are faced with new problems, scientists must construct new 
microworlds to address these problems. In contrast, people constructed 
knowledge in their lifeworlds by participative construction, especially in 
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pre-modern civilizations. Anthropologist Levy-Bruh] 0910/ 1966) indicated 
that the cultural systems of primitive people are constituted on the law of 
mystical participation, which conceptualizes human beings and nature as 
parts of an inseparable entity that can be viewed as a consciousness of 
cosmic holism (Taylor, 1871/ 1929). 
The worldviews of the lifeworld and the scientific microworld are 
essentially different. As people of a given culture contemplate the nature 
of the universe and the situation of humankind, they gradually formulate 
their worldviews with original thinking in the course of their histrny. 
Walsh and Middleton 0984) indicated that a worldview thus formulated 
usually answers four broad categories of questions: Who am I? What is my 
situation of life? Why do I suffer? How do I find salvation? Generally 
speaking, a worldview describes not only human nature but also the 
relationship between an individual and the external environment, as well 
as the individual's historical situation in the world. In addition, it provides 
a diagnosis for problems and prescribes a recipe for their solution. 
The worldview in a scientific microworld does not serve such a func-
tion. In his lexicon theory, Kuhn 0987) indicated that the scientific lexicon 
is composed of a set of terms with structure and content. Scientists use 
terms in the lexicon to make propositions in theory for describing the 
nature of the world. Theory and lexicon are inseparable. The microworld 
of a theory cannot be understood without its specific lexicon. Different 
theories are understood with their various lexicons. When a theory is 
changed, its lexicon will change with it. Each lexicon contains a method 
to recognize the world. Members of the same scientific community must 
master the same lexicon, understand the meanings of each term, and share 
the same worldview in order to communicate with one another. In order 
to think about the same problem and engage in related research in the 
same scientific community, they must share the same worldview. How-
ever, the worldview of a scientific microworld provides no answers to 
problems related to the meaning of life. It is essentially different from the 
worldview of a lifeworld. 
The contrast between the two types of knowledge in a scientific 
microworld and a lifeworld provides answers to the questions mentioned 
in Section III. In the following sections, I propose my answers to those 
questions. The first issue I discuss is the meaning of modernization. 
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Modernization and Social Change 
In Western countries, scientific microworlds are mainly those that 
evolved from the interior of the civilization and were utilized for various 
types of production after the European Renaissance in the 14'h Century. 
T11e implications of social change in the process of modernization can be 
elaborated in terms of the theory of communicative action proposed by 
Habermas (1978). According to Habermas, an individual's lifeworld is 
composed of three aspects, namely, culture, society and individual. For 
the aspect of culture, people sharing a certain cultural heritage may share 
the power of re-interpreting it, and determine the way of interpreting it 
through intersubjective communicative actions. For the aspect of society, 
communication may help people to establish standards of behavior, rein-
force their identification with the community, and strengthen the integra-
tion of society. For the aspect of the individual, growth resulting from 
constant communic~tion and learning may enable an individual to im-
prove capacity for action and help to shape the integrity of personality. 
Social systems in modern societies have evolved from people's 
lifeworlds through the process of rationalization. However, such newly 
differentiated social systems as university, industrial factory, or commer-
cial organization are not only different from people's lifeworlds, but also 
antagonistic to each other. The three functions of communication in an 
individual's lifeworld are mutual understanding, coordination of action, 
and socialization. These functions of communication may satisfy three 
kinds of individual social needs, namely cultural reproduction, social in-
tegration, and individual socialization. However, the major goal for sus-
taining most social systems in modern society is material reproduction, 
and the criterion for evaluating system evolution is the enhancement of 
social control. In order to achieve this goal, each system must try to search 
for or develop the most efficient microworld for material reproduction. 
People working in the system have to use technical thinking to solve the 
problems they encounter in their production work. In order to attain this 
goal, money and power replace the position of language in the lifeworld 
and become the major media for system integration. Seeking consensus 
through communication and coordination may also take into consider-
ation the one-dimensional thinking of reward and punishment. Systems in 
the lifeworld are liberated from the regulation of social norms, and be-
178 Hwang 
come more and more autonomous. Finally, the imperatives of social sys-
tem begin to instrumentalize the lifeworld. Habermas (1978) called this 
process colonization of the lifeworld by the social system. 
Modernization of Non-Western Societies 
Modernization of non-Western countries is fundamentally different 
from that of Western countries. TI1e modernization process of Western 
countries has been facilitated by various factors and evolved mainly from 
their cultural traditions, while the modernization of non-Western countries 
is induced by factors external to the culture. In the process of modernization 
for non-Western countries, people also have to differentiate various social 
systems from their lifeworlds, such as schools, factories, research institutes, 
and use various microworlds of scientific knowledge to engage in different 
types of production work. However, because this kind of knowledge is 
transplanted from a foreign culture, when terms in those lexicons are 
translated into the local language, they are obviously distinct from the 
native language used by the local people in their daily lives. It is not 
difficult for local people to tell the difference between foreign language 
and their own culture. 
Because rnicroworlds of scientific knowledge have the character of 
instrumental rationality, people usually learn it in school, and only profes-
sionals can use them systematically to do production work in various 
social systems. It is a matter of course that this kind of knowledge may 
penetrate into the lifeworlds of ordinary people through various channels 
of communication. However, for most non-professionals, though they may 
learn scientific knowledge fragmentally and use it in daily life, it remains 
at the level of common sense. It is very hard for ordinary people to utilize 
such knowledge systematically and engage in production work as a pro-
fessional does. 
Also, because scientific knowledge has the character of instrumental 
rationality, it is different from substantial rationality in nature. It can nei-
ther be used as a guide for an individual's value orientation, nor to answer 
problems about the meaning of life. In many circumstances, it cannot 
replace knowledge learned from cultural traditions, such as values, view 
of life, philosophy of life, ethics, or morality. People in non-Western soci-
eties certainly use the various microworlds of scientific knowledge that 
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they learned in school to engage in production work in the social system. 
But, they may also utilize the knowledge inherited from their cultural 
tradition to deal with problems in their lifeworlds. Thus, they may have 
different types of knowledge in their cognitive system, some originated 
from Western culture, and some inherited from their own cultural tradi-
tion. People retrieve the most appropriate knowledge from their cognitive 
system to solve a particular problem faced in a given life situation. Of 
course, it is quite possible that even the individuals themselves would not 
be able to identify where the knowledge originated from in most situa-
tions. 
This combination of types of knowledge is the most important reason 
for psychologists of non-Western countries to develop indigenous psychol-
ogy. So far as this point is concerned, the concept of domain-specific 
cultural theories proposed by Hong, Morris, Chiu, and Veronica (2000) is 
of particular importance. In other words, cultural theories originated from 
various cultural traditions are applicable in specific domains only (Yang, 
1988). In a particular domain of life, one may utilize microworlds of 
scientific knowledge to engage in production work, while in other do-
mains, one may instead use knowledge originating from one's own cultural 
tradition to solve the problem. One of the missions for non-Western psy-
chologists in developing indigenous psychology is to clarify what the most 
appropriate cultural theory is that can be used in a specific situation by 
people of a given cultural group. 
The Epistemological Goal of Indigenous Psychology 
If this philosophical reflection is acceptable, the philosophy of con-
structive realism provides an answer to previous debates about the episte-
mological goal of indigenous psychology. In all cultures one of the most 
thoroughly investigated subjects is human beings themselves. During the 
process of cultural development, each cultural group develops various 
cultural theories of "psychology" to deal with the problems that their 
members may come across in their daily lives. Therefore, indigenous psy-
chologists call for studying the psychological processes of local people as 
mediated by their native language in their lifeworlds. Mainstream psy-
chologists do not oppose this claim, but they emphasize the importance of 
constructing microworlds of psychological knowledge and argue that "dif-
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ferences in behavioral repertoires across cultural populations should be 
understood against the background of a broader frame of commonness" 
(Poortinga, 1999, p. 425). 
From the perspective of constructive realism, a solution for indige-
nous psychologists to resolve the debate is to construct formal theories (or 
microworlds) about the psychological functioning of the human mind that 
are supposed to be universal, and then use these theories to analyze the 
particular mentality of a people in their lifeworlds with moving culture. 
In order to attain this goal, indigenous psychologists in non-Western 
countries must admit that the philosophy of science containing the rules of 
the game for constructing microworlds of scientific knowledge is mainly a 
product of Western civilization. If they want to construct such microworlds, 
they have to transform their attitudes from anti-colonialism to post-colo-
nialism, make themselves familiar with the Western philosophy of sci-
ence, and utilize the most appropriate paradigm to solve the various aca-
demic problems they may encounter in attaining the epistemological goal 
of indigenous psychology. 
Conclusion 
Based on this framework, I have developed a series of theoretical 
models of Confucian relationalism over the past twenty years. First, I 
constructed a formal model of Face and Favor on the basis of scientific 
realism (Hwang, 1987), and then used this model as a framework to 
analyze the deeper structure of Confucianism (Hwang, 1995, 2001). Even 
colleagues who support the indigenous approach often ask me whether 
the cultural tradition of Confucianism still exists under the impact of West-
ern culture, and whether it is necessary to study Confucianism as a cultural 
system from the perspective of psychology. It is not difficult to see that such 
inquiries are proposed on the concept of moving culture. In responding to 
these kinds of questions, I emphasize that theoretical models about the 
deep structure of Confucianism are just microworlds constructed by a social 
scientist. They are cultural structures, but not psychological structures. 
Viewed from the perspective of structuralism, they are an unconscious 
model universal to all people in Confucian culture, but not a conscious 
model particular to any individual (Levi-Strauss, 1976). In people's actual 
lives, it is very hard to find any person who has the exact mentality as 
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described by the deep structure of a culture. However, such a structure can 
be used as a "broader frame of commonness" (Poortinga, 1999, p. 425) to 
study not only the social behaviors of people from Confucian societies, but 
also across various cultural populations. 
To be more specific, under the influence of Confucianism, people of 
East Asian societies have developed various language games for human 
practice or activity shared by their cultural group, such as cheong in Ko-
rean (Choi, Kim & Kim,1999; Choi & Choi, 2001), amae in Japanese (Doi, 
1973; Yamaguchi & Ariizumi, 2001) or renqing in Chinese (Hwang, 1987). 
These language games represent Confucian forms of life, which can be 
regarded as the surface structure derived from the deep structure of Con-
fucianism, or as cultural theories to be used in some specific domains of 
life by East Asian people. People in contemporary East Asian societies may 
or may not use these cultural theories in their lifeworlds. However, com-
prehension of this deep structure enables study of the unique feature of the 
Confucian mentality against the background of the universal structures of 
the human mind. By using this framework, empirical research may be 
conducted for the future development of indigenous psychology. 
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